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LABOR LAW-TENTH CIRCUIT MISPERCEIVES AND
MISAPPLIES THE PURPOSES OF THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, A DECISION LEAVING AIRLINE
PILOTS WITHOUT THE ACT'S PROTECTIONS:
KNAPP V. AMERICA WEST AIRLINES, INC.
JEFF ORKIN*
TN ORDER TO balance the demands of the workplace with the
.needs of families, promote the stability and economic security
of families, and promote national interests in preserving family
integrity, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA" or "Act").' By excluding a professional airline pilot's
reserve duty, or "on-call," time from the calculation of "hours
worked" under FMLA, the Tenth Circuit, in Knapp v. America
West Airlines, Inc.,2 has misapprehended and misapplied the pur-
poses of the Act and thereby excluded many professional airline
pilots from the Act's protections.
Susan Knapp ("Knapp") was an active pilot for America West
Airlines, Inc. ("Company") in 1995 when she and her husband
noticed that their eldest son displayed symptoms of fetal distress
syndrome.' Over the next several years, Knapp made periodic
leave requests under the FMLA and the Company's personal
leave policy in order to attend to the health care needs of her
son.4 The leave requests became more frequent in 1999. 5 In
late 1999 and early 2000, the Company granted some FMLA
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2008; B.S., Florida Tech, 1997. The author is a commercial airline pilot who
actively flew for American Airlines between 1999 and 2005.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codi-
fied at 29. U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)).
2 207 F. App'x 896, 900 (10th Cir. 2006).
3 Id. at 897.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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leave requests and denied others.6 Knapp eventually left the
employ of the Company due to her own medical issues.7
Knapp filed suit against the Company in 2001, alleging viola-
tion of her FMLA leave rights due to the Company's denials of
her leave requests.8 The district court determined Knapp did
not meet the requirements for FMLA leave because she had not
accrued the required 1,250 hours of service in the year preced-
ing her requested leave.9 The four categories of alleged work-
ing time evaluated by the court were active-duty time, training
time, layover time, and reserve-duty time.1 ° The court held that
Knapp's reserve-duty, or on-call, time did not count as hours of
service for purposes of meeting the 1,250 required hours of ser-
vice designated by the Act.11 In light of this calculation, the
court determined that Knapp "logged" 764 hours of service-
486 hours short of the required limit.' 2 Thus, the trial court
denied Knapp's motion for partial summary judgment and
granted the Company's motion for summary judgment. 3
Knapp appealed the trial court's decision, but the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed.14 As the court discussed, "[w]hether an employee
has worked the minimum 1250 hours of service is determined
according to the principles established under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") for determining compensable hours of
work."' 5 This issue is fact specific and determined on a case-by-
case basis. "Facts may show that the employee was engaged to
wait or they may show that he waited to be engaged."16 The test
used by the courts inquires who the time primarily benefits-the
employer or the employee.' 7 Some of the factors courts evalu-
ate include agreements between the parties, any restrictions on
the employee during the waiting periods, the relationship be-




9 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)).
10 Id.
it Id. at 897-98.
12 Id. at 897.
13 Id. at 898.
14 Id. at 897.
15 Id. at 898 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c) (2007)).
16 Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944); 29 C.F.R.
§ 785.14 (2007)).
17 Id. at 898.
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ing circumstances."8 When an employee is not required to
remain on the employer's premises during the waiting period,
"the critical inquiry is whether the employee is able to use the
time effectively for [his or her] own purposes."'19
Knapp was content to allow the Tenth Circuit to focus its in-
quiry on the restrictions placed on her time during the reserve
waiting periods that the trial court discussed-a prohibition on
the consumption of alcohol and the requirement to answer the
telephone and report to duty within one hour after receiving a
call. 20 The record also revealed that, while on call, Knapp could
not scuba dive, schedule doctor's appointments, accompany her
children on field trips, play golf, grocery shop, or do anything
that would preclude her from "immediately dropping every-
thing in order to meet the one-hour callout.
2 1
The court compared Knapp's situation with previous Tenth
Circuit precedent.22 In Andrews v. Town of Skiatook,21 the court
was presented with an FLSA claim brought by an emergency
medical technician against the town of Skiatook, Oklahoma.
Andrews' schedule included four twelve-hour shifts per week for
which he was compensated and four on-call twelve-hour shifts
per week for which he was not compensated. 24 Andrews claimed
that the on-call shifts were compensable under FLSA "because
of the restrictions placed on his personal activities during the
on-call time. '25 He was only compensated for the on-call time if
he was called to make a run, in which case Andrews received a
minimum of two hours' pay at a rate one and one-half times his
normal rate.26 After declaring the test to determine compen-
sability of waiting time to be the same test mentioned above,27
the court ruled that Andrews' on-call time was not compensa-
ble. 28 The court determined that Andrews was only called to
IS Id. (citing Boehm v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th
Cir. 1989)).
19 Id. (citing Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991);
29 C.F.R. § 785.17 (2007)).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 899.
22 Id.
23 Andrews v. Town of Skiatook, 123 F.3d 1327, 1328 (10th Cir. 1997).
24 Id. at 1328.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1330.
27 Boehm v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir.
1989).
28 Andrews, 123 F.3d at 1332.
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work during his on-call shifts sixteen percent of the time in 1993
and twenty-three percent of the time in 1994.29 The court dis-
tinguished this case from a previous case in which firefighters
were compensated for on-call time because they received as
many as thirteen calls per on-call shift."0 Several other Tenth
Circuit decisions also hold that on-call time is not compensa-
ble.' In fact, only in Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. did the
Tenth Circuit find on-call time to be compensable. 2
In Pabst, plaintiffs were electronics technicians in Oklahoma
Gas & Electric's ("OG&E") facility operations department. 33
Their duties included monitoring heat, fire, and security alarms
in several OG&E buildings. 4 The court determined that the
employees responded to an average of three to five alarms per
night while on call, with each alarm requiring approximately
forty-five minutes of the employees' time to resolve.3 5 The em-
ployees received a minimum of one hour of pay for each alarm
they resolved from home and two hours of pay if resolving the
alarm required the employee to visit the facility to resolve the
issue.3 6 The district court found the on-call time compensable
because of the frequency of the alarms during the on-call peri-
ods and because the employees had to continually return home,
if away, every fifteen minutes to check their computers for indi-
cations of an alarm.3 ' The court determined that these restric-
tions placed an undue burden on the employees' being able to
pursue personal activities. 8 The Tenth Circuit, after comparing
this case to the other cases mentioned above, affirmed the trial
29 Id. at 1331.
30 Id. (stating that the infrequency of callbacks in this case clearly distinguishes
it from Renfro); cf. Renfro v. City of Emporia, 729 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Kan.
1990).
31 See, e.g., Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding on-call time not compensable even though detectives on call are re-
quired to remain sober, remain available by beeper, and must report within
twenty minutes after being called); Norton v. Worthern Van Serv., Inc., 839 F.2d
653, 654-56 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding on-call time not compensable even
though drivers must be available to report to work within twenty minutes after
being called).
32 See Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005).
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court's decision.39 The court stated that because all FLSA com-
pensability cases are fact specific, counting published cases is a
meaningless exercise; the proper question is to determine which
reported case is most analogous to the current one.4" The court
stated further that the critical distinction in all of the above-
mentioned cases is the frequency of calls an employee receives
while "on-call."41 Finding that Pabst was most analogous to Ren-
fro due to the frequency of calls the employees received while on
call, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.42
The court in Knapp decided that this case was most analogous
to precedent that did not entitle the employee to FMLA leave
because the restrictions placed on Knapp's on-call time were not
demonstrably more restrictive than in previous cases. Though
the court once again stated that each FLSA compensability case
requires a fact-intensive inquiry, when deciding Knapp, the court
failed to heed its own advice and ultimately reached an incor-
rect result.
When deciding FLSA compensability claims, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has often repeated the Supreme Court's legal test, which
requires an evaluation of the particular circumstances of each
case.4 4 However, as mentioned above, the Tenth Circuit focuses
its inquiry on the frequency of calls an on-call employee receives
during a shift. Such a narrow focus led to the court's improper
decision in Knapp. Knapp is distinguishable from all Tenth Cir-
cuit precedent. The issue in all of the court's prior cases was
whether or not the on-call employee should be compensated for
the on-call time. Compensability is not the true issue in Knapp.
Airline pilots are compensated for reserve, or on-call, waiting
time.45 The true issue is whether these compensated hours
should count as hours of service under FMLA. Had the court
39 Id. at 1137.
40 Id. at 1134.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Knapp v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 207 F. App'x 896, 900 (10th Cir. 2006).
4 See, e.g., Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1132 (referring to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944)).
45 See, e.g., AirlinePilotCentral, U.S. Airways Airline Profile, http://airlinepilot
central.com/airlines/legacy/us-ainvays.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) [herein-
after Airline Pilot Central] (showing a monthly reserve guarantee between sev-
enty-two and seventy-seven hours, which means that a reserve pilot will be paid at
least seventy-two to seventy-seven hours for a reserve month regardless of the
number of hours actually flown during the month).
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properly evaluated all factors of the stated test, it would have
reached the opposite conclusion.
As mentioned above, the proper test is whether the waiting
time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or the
employee's benefit.46 The relevant factors include "considera-
tion of the agreement between the parties, the nature and ex-
tent of restrictions, the relationship between the services
rendered and the on-call time, and the surrounding circum-
stances."47 Clearly, the agreement between the parties, (a col-
lective bargaining agreement between the airline and its pilots'
union) establishes that reserve time is compensable.48
Furthermore, a reserve airline pilot's job is to be ready to fly
when called upon to do so on short notice. Airlines maintain
reserve lists of pilots in order to maintain schedule reliability
when unforeseen circumstances disrupt the daily flight sched-
ule. Such circumstances include late-notice sick calls by regu-
larly scheduled pilots and weather and mechanical delays
preventing a regularly-scheduled pilot from reaching a particu-
lar destination. When such disruptions occur, the airline assigns
the reserve pilot to the affected flight(s), thereby maintaining,
as closely as possible, an on-time operation. Thus, it clearly can
be stated that a reserve pilot's waiting time is spent primarily for
the employer's benefit, not the employee's benefit, because of
the importance each airline places on maintaining on-time
operation.49
Also, the court has repeatedly said that the surrounding cir-
cumstances must be considered. 50 The surrounding circum-
stances in this case necessitate a result that reserve time be
considered hours of service for purposes of FMLA. Airline pi-
lots select monthly flying assignments, regular lines of flying
time, or reserve schedules on a seniority basis. 5' The most se-
nior pilot selects first and the process repeats until all pilots are
awarded a monthly schedule. Thus, the junior-most pilots do
not have a wide selection of available options. In fact, the jun-
ior-most pilots are generally defacto forced into a reserve selec-
46 Knapp, 207 F. App'x at 896.
47 Id. (quoting Boehm v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1185
(10th Cir. 1989)).
48 Airline Pilot Central, supra note 45.
49 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944).
50 See Knapp, 207 F. App'x at 898; Boehm, 868 F.2d at 1185.
51 The author of this casenote was a pilot for American Airlines for 5 years. His
experiences are fairly typical for the industry as a whole.
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tion because all regular lines of time have been previously
selected. In stagnant economic cycles, when an airline is not
growing and expanding, it is not uncommon for ajunior pilot to
spend years on reserve. Furthermore, a reserve pilot has abso-
lutely no control over the number of actual flying hours to be
performed in a given month. The number of flying hours as-
signed is based solely on the needs of the company. Therefore,
it is quite possible to have a full-time, professional pilot em-
ployed for several years with the same company who never
achieves the requisite number of working hours to be consid-
ered an eligible employee within the meaning of FMLA.52
Moreover, assuming arguendo that only flight hours and training
time count for purposes of determining FMLA eligibility, 5 no
airline pilot will fall within the Act's protections because airline
pilots are restricted, by federal regulations, to 1,000 hours of fly-
ing time in a twelve-month period.54 It can hardly be assumed
that Congress meant to exclude the nation's airline pilots, a
group so vital to the national economy, from the protections of
the Act.55
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit court has mistakenly re-
moved thousands of full-time, professional employees from the
benefits of the Act. The court is seemingly requiring that airline
employees rely on the benevolence of their employers to grant
them time away from work when unforeseen medical complica-
tions arise. Considering that airlines received billions of dollars
of federal aid after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks and
still obtained massive labor concessions from employees in the
years following the attacks, the court requires airline employees
to place a trust in their management teams to "do the right
thing" that is surely not deserved.
52 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
53 Knapp, 207 F. App'x at 897 (assuming but not deciding that layover time
would count as hours worked for FMLA purposes); but see Rich v. Delta Air Lines,
921 F. Supp. 767, 776 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that a flight attendant's layover
time is not included in the determination of hours worked for purposes of
FMLA).
54 14 C.F.R. § 121.471(a)(1) (2007).
55 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b) (West 1999) (stating the purposes of FMLA).
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